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2SAILING AROUND ERIE:  THE EMERGENCE OF A FEDERAL GENERAL 
COMMON LAW OF ARBITRATION
By Kenneth F. Dunham1A
Introduction:
Some legal scholars opine that the current law on arbitration agreements is a natural 
evolution of American contract law, while others are of the opinion that binding 
contractual arbitration is a violation of existing federal law.1  The positions taken by the 
academy and the legal community on arbitration have developed from the same factual 
events, case law and statutes.  How could so many people examine the same material and 
defend positions which are polar opposites?  Paradise for some, yet purgatory for others, 
the binding pre-dispute arbitration clause evokes a night and day reaction depending upon 
who is polled.
Few legal scholars would argue that arbitration law in the United States today is 
totally different from arbitration law in the United States prior to 1925.2  From colonial 
times until the passage of the United States Arbitration Act (USAA) in 1925, binding pre-
dispute arbitration agreements were considered unenforceable in most U.S. courts.3  The 
1A
 Associate Professor of Law, ADR Director, Thomas Goode Jones School of Law, Faulkner University.
1
 For example, the work of two legal scholars yields opposite results.  Professor Stephen Ware makes the 
evolution of law argument in his book Alternative Dispute Resolution West, 2001.  He has also voiced his 
support of binding contractual arbitration in numerous law review and journal articles.  Professor Jean 
Sternlight has written numerous articles criticizing the effects of binding contractual arbitration, especially 
in consumer cases.  In “Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial,” a paper presented at the Roscoe 
Pound Institute, Professor Sternlight argues that arbitration is becoming a substitute for jury trials and 
interferes with access to justice by depriving claimants of their Seventh Amendment rights.
2
 Both of the above listed professors in their works and numerous other legal scholars in their contributions 
to the field agree that the American arbitration landscape in 1924 bears little resemblance to today’s 
broadened picture of enforcement of nearly every kind of arbitration agreement.
3
 Prior to the enactment of the United States Arbitration Act in 1925, the vast majority of states followed 
the old common law arbitration doctrine of revocability.  For a more thorough discussion of the state of 
American arbitration law prior to 1925, see Professor Ian MacNeil’s book American Arbitration Law, 
Oxford University Press 1992.  Professor MacNeil describes the American arbitration scene prior to 1925 
in great detail.
3chief argument of the opponents of binding contractual arbitration is that Congress never 
intended the USAA to be more than a federal procedural act applicable only in the federal 
court system.  The supporters of binding contractual arbitration argue that Congress 
actually intended the USAA to be substantive law applicable in all courts.  Therefore, 
one’s view of history is critical when developing a position statement on this issue.
The USAA became codified as Title 9 U.S.C.A. 1 et. seq. in 1947, as the Federal 
Arbitration Act.  The federal cases in which the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is 
scrutinized may be placed into two general categories.  Category one includes cases prior 
to 1984, in which the federal courts consistently held that the FAA was a federal 
procedural act with judicial preference for its use.  Category two includes cases decided 
after 1984, in which the federal courts consistently held that the FAA is substantive law 
and therefore preempts contrary state law.  
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court in Southland v. Keating4 held that the 
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was applicable in all courts as substantive law.  Prior to 
Southland the FAA was generally understood to be a federal procedural act applicable 
only in the federal courts.5  Justice O’Connor opined that the U.S. Supreme Court 
4 Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).  This case held that the FAA should no longer be considered a 
procedural act applicable only in federal courts, but was substantive law applicable in all courts.  Justice 
Burger opined in Southland, “In enacting section 2 of the federal act (FAA), Congress declared a national 
policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the 
resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration….  The Federal 
Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause….  
Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong indications that Congress had in 
mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable only in the federal courts.”  Justice 
O’Connor dissented and argued that the FAA was a procedural act applicable only in federal courts.  
Justice Rehniqint joined with Justice O’Connor in the dissent which stated in part, “In 1925 Congress 
emphatically believed arbitration to be a matter of ‘procedure’….  Today’s decision is unfaithful to 
congressional intent, unnecessary, and in light of the FAA’s antecedents and the intervening contraction of 
federal power, inexplicable.”  The intervening contraction of federal power likely referred to the court’s 
presumed power to decide general law before Erie.  Southland became the seminal case on federal 
preemption of state law by the FAA under the Supremacy Clause.
5
 Id. See Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Southland
4reinterpreted an existing procedural act to create substantive law.6 Southland’s critics 
have charged that it has led to a body of federal general common law of arbitration which 
is theoretically prohibited by the holding in Erie v. Thompkins.7
The view by proponents of binding contractual arbitration is that Southland was not
a one hundred, eighty degree turn from the high court’s prior opinions on the effect of the 
FAA.  Southland was the first case which clearly set forth the position the United States 
Supreme Court had endeavored to take in earlier cases.8 Southland, according to its 
supporters, was not an end run around the Erie principle, but a result of the Erie
principle’s application to existing federal law.9
A lot of paper and words have been used to defend these two positions.  This article 
postulates that reinterpretation of statutes from the bench is a not so rare occurrence in 
any court especially in federal courts.  The United States Constitution in Article III, 
section 2 grants the United States Supreme Court and inferior federal courts the power to 
interpret federal statutes.  The federal courts regularly interpret the intent of congress in 
federal statutes, even though the statutes subject to judicial interpretation may have been 
in place for decades.  Obviously, the 1984 Southland interpretation of the intent of 
6
 Id.
7 Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  Justice Brandeis pronouncements in Erie have remained 
good law for over 67 years.  The case came before the United States Supreme Court on the issue of whether 
a federal court in ruling on a matter of general jurisprudence should apply state law or exercise independent 
judgment?  The principle holding in Erie was that in federal courts except when a matter is governed by the 
U.S. Constitution or a federal statute, the law to be applied is the law of the state.  The rationale behind the 
holding was that federal courts lacked the power to declare substantive rules through case law.  Hence, the 
conclusion reached in Erie was that federal general common law does not exist.
8
 In earlier cases the United States Supreme Court wrestled with the relationship between state law and the 
FAA, but never concluded that the FAA was substantive law.  The Supreme Courts struggle with the 
federalism suggested by Erie is illustrated in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc. 350 U.S. 198 
(1956).  The Supreme Court in Bernhardt made references to the federal law of arbitration, but declined to 
rule that the FAA preempted state law.  For a more in depth discussion of the reasoning of the court in 
Bernhardt, see Professor Murray, Rau and Sherman’s book Arbitration, Foundation Press 1996, pp. 55-56.
9
 The supporters of arbitration have argued that Erie actually helped the U.S. Supreme Court to move 
toward the holding in Southland.  See Professor Stephen Ware’s book Alternative Dispute Resolution, West 
2001, pp. 28-30.
5Congress in 1925, when it passed the USAA/FAA, was not based on a consultation with 
the deceased original sponsors of the legislation, but rather on a careful examination of 
statutory language.  Some of Southland’s dissenters argue that the real harm in Southland
lies in the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court changed existing law from the bench.  Some 
of these dissenters were on the Southland court and voiced their opposition in 
Southland.10
The following pages contain a brief discussion of the history of arbitration in the 
United States, followed by a history of the FAA, and a discussion of the intent behind the 
original USAA in 1925.  This article postulates that the United States Supreme Court 
opinions prior to Southland in favor of arbitration, allowed the Supreme Court majority in 
Southland to avoid the limitations of the Erie principle against creating a body of federal 
general common law through interpretation and clarification of the intent of Congress.  
Although prior federal court decisions did not hold that federal procedural law was 
substantive law applicable in state courts, the language in several older Supreme Court 
opinions indicates the high court has been troubled for many years by such issues as state 
court forum shopping.11  An analysis of the reach of Southland through its progeny sets 
the stage for the sections which follow on the direction the Southland decision is taking 
American arbitration.  The article contends that Southland was not a surprise holding, but 
a holding consistent with a pattern of movement by federal courts away from federal 
procedure status toward substantive law status for the FAA.  
10
 Supra Note 4.
11 Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).  This case held that federal courts cannot “create” 
substantive rights denied by state courts in diversity cases, and cannot deny substantive rights created by 
state law in accordance with Erie.  The outcome in federal court or in state court should be the same under 
Erie, Federal courts cannot allow plaintiffs to forum shop between courts depending upon the outcome they 
desire.  In diversity cases the same outcome must be available in state courts and federal courts, and this is 
accomplished by following the state statutes.
6I. Addressing the Erie Problem:
There is a handlebar shaped pile of rocks at the entrance to the Marina Del Rey 
yacht basin not shown on most Los Angeles city maps.  At the ocean end of the Marina 
Del Rey channel a massive collection of boulders serves as a breakwater jetty.  
Yachtsmen sailing into or out of Marina Del Rey must sail around this barrier to 
navigation in order to arrive at their destination.  The skilled sailor does not sail into the 
rocks, but tacks to change direction thereby avoiding the rocks.  Established legal 
principles are sometimes like those rocks because longstanding rock solid legal principles 
sometimes act as barriers to progress.  When progress is needed those outdated principles 
can be sailed around by skilled members of the judiciary employing analysis tools to 
interpret old statutes in a new light.  This is not an unfair or even unusual method of 
gaining access to the desired destination.
In 1938, the United States Supreme Court in Erie v. Thompkins held that “Except in 
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or Acts of Congress, the law to be applied 
in any case is the law of the state.”12 Erie was intended to act as a complete barrier to 
federal courts sailing straight ahead in diversity cases to legislate from the bench and 
make new law.  Erie allegedly forced those courts to follow state law.13  Prior to Erie, 
federal courts were free to chart their own course in diversity cases, even if that course 
ignored the public policies of the states.  Post Erie, federal courts, at least theoretically, 
could no longer craft decisions that ignored state law principles in diversity cases to 
create a body of federal general common law in a subject area.14
12Erie R.R. v. Thompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Supra Note 7.
13
 Id. 
14
 Id. 
7Erie’s purpose was to force federal courts to consistently apply state substantive 
law and federal procedural law in diversity removal cases.15  However, the Erie principle 
has never been an ironclad doctrine applicable in all cases at all times.16  The survival of 
removal actions in federal courts usually depends upon state law principles,17 but federal 
common law controls the interpretation of federal statutory intent.18 Erie was never 
intended to bar federal courts in diversity cases from interpreting existing federal statutes.  
It’s purpose was to stop federal courts from creating new federal law that ignored existing 
state law principles when the case was based upon state law.  A general state choice-of-
law clause within an arbitration agreement does not force FAA mandates to yield to state 
law, because agreements to arbitrate are controlled by a federal statute not state law.19
Therefore, even under the Erie principle, state law cannot bar binding arbitration under 
the FAA.20  Subsequent to Southland, opinions interpreting the FAA have resulted in a 
body of federal substantive law regarding arbitrability.21  This body of federal law 
preempts state law even if the contract containing the arbitration clause purports to be 
governed by state law.  Thus, for all practical purposes, state law has been ousted from 
the arbitration arena.  It is necessary to understand the history of binding arbitration 
agreements in the United States and additionally understand the history of the FAA in 
order to understand the current state of arbitration law in the United States.    
15 Gosperini v. Center for Humanities, 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996).  Under the Erie doctrine, federal courts 
sitting in diversity apply state substantive and federal procedural law.
16 Hill v. Martinez, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1115, (Colorado 2000) State law controls in federal diversity cases 
unless it is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution.
17 Caine v. Hardy 943 F.2d 1406, Cert. Denied 503 U.S. 936 (Miss 1991).  Survival of some federal actions 
depend upon the state laws of the state in which the federal court sits.
18 U.S. v. NEC Corp.  11 F. 3d 136 (Fla. 1993).
19 Sovak v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 280 F.3d 1266, rehearing denied 289 F3d 615 (Cal. 2002).
20 Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F2d 932 (Cal. 1992).  State adhesion laws cannot nullify an 
agreement to arbitrate under the FAA.
21 Hatzlachh Supply Inc. v. Moishe’s Electronic Inc. 828 F. Supp. 178 (NY 1993).  Although state law 
applies to contracts to arbitrate to determine if the parties agreed to arbitrate, there is a body of federal 
substantive law created by the FAA governing arbitrability of disputes.
8II. The History of Predispute Binding Arbitration in the United States:
The idea of a general common law developed early in the recorded history of 
England.22  It was brought to the colonies by the English, and this common law was 
incorporated into the body of United States law.23  Common law probably originated 
from the solidification of customs into case law.24  English monarchs were not concerned 
with the needs and interests of commoners, so the common law served as a safety net for 
public freedom.25  Under King Henry II, court decisions were written down and filed 
under various categories for future reference.26  A filing system allowed future judges to 
review prior decisions in the same category of law, and the case collection developed into 
binding precedents, or stare decisis.  English courts rarely reconsidered issues of a similar 
nature.27  Once a recognized case set forth a principle to be followed, most judges 
followed the stare decisis, even if they might personally wish to do otherwise.28
Common law and arbitration have a long and somewhat adversarial relationship.29
In fact, purpose of the FAA as set forth in Southland was to overcome judicial hostility to 
arbitration as a process of resolving disputes.  Until recent years, American courts 
generally viewed arbitration with suspicion.30  Federal decisions ordering arbitration to 
replace jury trials, when an underlying contract contains a predispute contractual 
arbitration clause, have resulted in negative feelings about arbitration within the 
22
 Rial, Julie S., Origins of Common Law, International Encyclopedia of Justice Studies. Com, December 
2002.
23
 Id.
24
 Id.
25
 Glasser, Edward L., Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, p. 23.  Yale Law School, Economics and 
Organization Workshop, January, 2002.
26 Understanding Common Law, Sovereign Services, 1994, http://www.buildfreedom.com.
27
 Id.
28
 Id.
29 EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002).  There has been a long standing hostility between courts 
and arbitration.  
30
 Id.
9plaintiff’s bar.31  Some consumer groups have purchased billboards and personified 
arbitration as an evil personage who robs average consumers of their due.32
Arbitration is not a thief.  Arbitration is not a person.  Arbitration is a conflict 
resolution process used to resolve disputes that resembles a bench trial.  There is not 
much mystery in the process.  Arbitration has been around for centuries and has been 
used all over the world to resolve conflicts.33  In the 17th Century, English courts held 
arbitration was a non-binding process.34  The English courts became concerned that 
arbitration had the potential to displace or oust the court’s role in society.35  Through a 
series of court decisions limiting the effect of arbitration, the English courts began to 
view arbitration as a non-binding process based upon the principle of agency 
revocability.36  The English reversed their position on binding arbitration in 1889, but 
American courts continued down the old common law path.37 The common law doctrine 
of revocability was followed by American courts until the enactment of the FAA in 
1925.38  The doctrine of revocability was grounded in the public law courts fear that they 
31
 Id.
32
 Alabama highway billboards sponsored by a “grass roots” consumer movement against arbitration 
personify arbitration as a thief who steals rights.  “Arbitration Steals Your Right To A Jury Trial.”
33Riskin, Leonard L., Dispute Resolution and Lawyers, West (1997) p. 503 Nearly all-ancient civilizations 
record the use of arbitration.  Moses used arbitration during the Exodus.  The Romans and Greeks used the 
process in connection with their court systems.  In the Middle Ages it was used in the European guild 
system to resolve disputes.  Arbitration was present in English common law and was brought to America 
by the colonists.  George Washington used arbitration to resolve Virginia land.  In Vyniors, case 77 Eng. 
Rep 595 (K.B. 1609), Lord Coke opined that the English court’s views of arbitration as revocable at will by 
the parties who had contracted to use it.  The rule set forth in Vyniors case was that the arbitrators were 
agents of the parties, and the arbitrator’s agency could be revoked by the parties at any time until an 
arbitration hearing had been held.  This became known as the revocability doctrine.  A second reason to 
make arbitration revocable was the “ouster doctrine.”  Courts were afraid that arbitration would oust them 
from their jurisdiction over legal matters.
34
 Id.
35
 Id.
36
 Id.
37
 The English Arbitration Act of 1889 made arbitration agreements irrevocable.
38 Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845).  A Massachusetts court refused to 
order specific performance of an arbitration agreement contained in a public works contract.  The Tobey 
court stated it was impractical to use equity to order arbitration and the plaintiff should exercise the legal 
10
might be displaced by a private process of dispute resolution and thereby be put out of 
work.
The American judiciary’s view of arbitration prior to the FAA was that the parties’ 
pre-dispute contract to use arbitration, instead of the public courts, to resolve the dispute 
would result in an improper removal or ouster of the court’s jurisdiction.39  Some state 
statutes still follow the old common law view of arbitration.  For example, Alabama’s 
anti-pre-dispute arbitration statute, Ala. Code 8-1-41 (3), follows the common law view 
of arbitration from the 18th and 19th centuries.40  After the passage of the FAA in 1925, 
many states adopted modern arbitration statutes in order to align their state law with 
current federal law on arbitration, but other states like Alabama hung on to its old laws.  
From American Colonial times until 1925, several state statutes and the greater body of 
American case law held binding pre-dispute contractual arbitration agreements to be 
unenforceable and revocable at will by the parties who contracted for arbitration.41
III. The History Of The Federal Arbitration Act:  New York Arbitration Act To 
Southland And Beyond.
On April 19, 1920, the state of New York enacted the New York Arbitration Act, 
code of Civil Procedure Sect. 2386, and today that act has been expanded into 
Consolidated Laws of New York, CPLR Section 75.42  The New York statute made 
remedies available.  In Home Insurance Company of New York v. Morse, 87 U.S. 445 (1874), the United 
States Supreme Court held pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate were invalid due to the common law 
revocability of such agreements.
39Stone, Katherine V.W., Arbitration Law 2-3 (Foundation Press 2003) and Private Justice, The Law of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, Foundation Press (2003) 305.  Vynoirs 77 Eng. Rep 595 (K.B. 1609).
40
 Ala. Code 8-1-41(3).
41 The Birmingham News Company v. Sherry Horn, Ala. Supreme Court Case No. 1020553, June 11, 2004.  
Under common law pre-dispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements were considered revocable at will 
by the parties involved, if either desired to back out of the agreement prior to an arbitration hearing.  The 
FAA makes such agreements enforceable.
42
 Consolidated Laws of New York, CPLR 75, is the latest version of the New York Arbitration Act.
11
contractual arbitration agreements binding.  The party seeking arbitration moved a state 
court for an order to compel arbitration.  The United States Supreme Court held that the 
New York Arbitration Act could be used to enforce specific performance of a contract to 
arbitrate, but it could not be used as a complete bar to litigation.43
  Following, hearings, in which the procedural nature of the FAA was hashed and 
re-hashed, the United States Congress failed to vote on the first version of a federal 
arbitration statute in 1922, but the proposed statute was withdrawn and amended by its 
supporters and the American Bar Association and brought back to Congress in 1924.44  It 
was enacted as the United States Arbitration Act (USAA) on February 12, 1925.45  The 
language of the USAA was principally patterned after the language of the New York 
Arbitration Act, but the final version contained some significant changes from the New 
York Act.46  The USAA was eventually codified as the United States Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA), United States Code Title 9, on July 30, 1947.  The hearings which were held 
prior to the original enactment of the USAA in 1925, did not indicate that the act would 
43
 Kennedy, Donald J., Maritime Arbitration 1899-1999, Carter, Ledyard & Milburn LLP 2003.  Although 
the New York Arbitration Act held promise to overcome the longstanding judicial hostility regarding 
arbitration, in its initial test in the court, Atlantic Fruit Co. v. Red Cross Line, 264 U.S. 109 (1924), held 
that the New York statute was an available remedy to enforce a contract, but not a bar to litigation.
44
 MacNeil, Ian R., American Arbitration Law, Oxford University Press, NY (1992), p. 42.  Professor 
MacNeil traces the history of arbitration in America through the 19th and 20th Centuries.  He includes the 
beginning of the movement to change arbitration law from holding arbitration agreements unenforceable to 
holding them enforceable in federal courts.  He traces the history of the FAA from the efforts of a few to 
the push by the ABA to get the act through Congress.  He discusses the impact of Southland v. Keating and 
moves on to discuss international arbitration and the New York Convention.  MacNeil criticizes 
Southland’s court for ignoring the history of the FAA and transforming the act into a different kind of law 
than the one envisioned by its drafters.  Although MacNeil’s conclusions about the FAA have been 
challenged by some scholars, his historical digest of the FAA’s early years is without equal.
45
 Id. p. 47.
46
 Id. p. 52.
12
be binding on state courts.47  The FAA did not contain so much as a sentence fragment 
granting federal jurisdiction in arbitration cases.48
According to Professor Ian MacNeil in his book American Arbitration,49 there were 
a number of organizations across the United States that endeavored to promote binding 
arbitration in the late 1800’s and early 1900’s.  The American Bar Association got behind 
these efforts and spear-headed the movement to get a national arbitration act to 
Congress.50  However, due to some objections to the draft act, the ABA withdrew and 
revised the first draft of the USAA and resubmitted it to congress.  The revised draft was 
eventually passed in virtually the same form as it exists today.51  The history of 
arbitration law under the USAA, and prior to the USAA as a collection of states passing 
arbitration statutes, is an interesting series of events containing numerous “ups” and 
“downs” for the use of arbitration as an alternative to the public law courts.
Following its passage in 1925, the USAA was used in the federal courts, if a 
binding predispute arbitration contract clause was present in a federal case.52  The federal 
courts refused to order arbitration under the USAA if the matter was originally litigated 
in a state court, before being removed to the federal court on diversity grounds.  This was 
due at least in part to the Erie doctrine’s state law application mandates.  Following 
Southland the references in the case law to Erie all but disappeared, and federal courts 
47
 Id. p. 117 & 118.
48
 9 U.S.C.A. Sect. 1 et. seq.
49
 Supra Note 44.
50
 Id.
51
 Id.  Professor MacNeil’s descriptions of the early days of the arbitration effort are quite colorful.
52
 Id.
13
now routinely cite the FAA’s Section 2 language placing arbitration agreements in any 
court upon the same footing as other contracts.53
There is no specific language in the FAA, 9 USCA Section 1 et. seq., that states 
there is a federal policy in favor of arbitration which preempts contrary state law.  The 
federal policy favoring arbitration language came from Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. 
V. Mercury Construction Company 460 U.S. 1 (1983), and was confirmed and expounded 
upon by the United States Supreme Court in Southland with its interpretation of the intent 
of Congress dating back to when the USAA was drafted in 1925.54 Southland
harmonized the outcome of arbitration under the FAA with the outcome under state 
law.55  The Erie doctrine was discussed in arbitration cases prior to Southland, such as 
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America.56  However, the federal courts declined to 
53 HIM Portland, LLC v. Devito Builders, 317 F.3d 41 (2003).  Justice Torruella wrote “Congress enacted 
the FAA to place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts and to render them valid, 
irrevocable and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”
54 Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).  Supra Note 1 “In enacting section 2 of the federal act (FAA), 
Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of the states to require a 
judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. . . .  
The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Congress to enact substantive rules under the 
Commerce Clause. . .   Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities, there are strong 
indications that Congress had in mind something more than making arbitration agreements enforceable 
only in the federal courts.”  
55
 Id.
56 Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, Inc. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).  Bernhardt entered into an 
employment contract containing an arbitration clause in New York.  Bernhardt later moved to Vermont, 
and performed his duties under the employment contract in Vermont.  Bernhardt was fired by Polygraphic 
Company of America, Inc., while working in Vermont.  He brought a lawsuit against Polygraphic in a 
Vermont state court, and Polygraphic removed it to federal district court.  The U.S. District Court denied 
Polygraphic’s motion to compel arbitration due to the Erie doctrine requirement of following state law in 
cases removed on diversity grounds.  Justice Douglas of the United States Supreme Court wrote the 
majority opinion which remanded the case to the federal district court in Vermont to determine which state 
law, Vermont or New York, applied to Bernhardt’s case.  Justice Douglas opined that Erie R. Co. v. 
Thompkins required the case to be decided by local law.  The California Supreme Court in its holding in 
Southland appeared to follow the Erie doctrine in its application of California law.  Justice Douglas based 
the court’s treatment of Bernhardt on principles set forth in Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, and stated 
“If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disallow it, the outcome of the litigation 
might depend on the courthouse where suit is brought.”
14
disturb the perceived procedural status of the FAA until Southland.57  The early cases 
acknowledged the problem of state versus federal court forum shopping but did nothing 
to correct the problem because earlier cases viewed the FAA as procedural.58  Some have 
been critical of the California state trial court’s analysis in Southland, but the California 
Supreme Court’s ruling in Southland followed very closely the principles enunciated by 
the United States Supreme Court in 1956, in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 
Inc.59 Bernhardt viewed the FAA as a procedural statute.60  However, Bernhardt
confirmed the principle of eliminating forum shopping by stating the same result should 
be obtained in state and federal courts as had been previously enunciated in Guaranty 
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).61  The California trial court that heard the 
Southland case likely thought it had followed the prevailing law in arbitration cases. 
IV. Locating the Original Intent Of Congress:  Coupling The FAA and The 
Commerce Clause And Attaching Both To The Supremacy Clause:
At the time Southland was decided, some states had statutes making the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements illegal as against public policy.62  Following 
Southland, the United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the Commerce 
Clause, as it applies to FAA sanctioned arbitrations, must be interpreted broadly so as to 
apply to state court actions affecting interstate commerce.63  The United States Supreme 
Court has also made it clear that the FAA is preemptive of any contrary state statute 
57 Southland, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).  See Note 4.
58 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. 198 (1956).  Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion in Bernhardt concluded 
that the FAA was tied to U.S. Constitution Article III, Section 2 and “does not obviously apply to diversity 
cases.”  Supra Note 47.
59
 Id. at 204
60
 Id. at 203
61 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).  See Note 11.
62
 25.  Alabama, Mississippi, and West Virginia.  See Stephen J. Ware, Alternative Dispute Resolution.  
(West Group 2001).
63 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, 123 S. Ct. 2037 (2003).
15
under the Supremacy Clause, because the FAA clearly expresses the intent of Congress to 
enforce arbitration agreements to the full reach of the Commerce Clause.64
For nearly sixty years the United States Supreme Court, in apparent compliance 
with Erie, held that state law should be applied to arbitration agreements in state courts.65
Erie was pure federalism.  The Southland opinion was seen as inconsistent with 
federalism, although it was rendered by a court supportive of federalism principles.66
The dissent in Southland by Justice O’Connor and Justice Rehnquist is indicative of a 
federalist’s response to Southland.
Professor Stephen Ware opines that the federal courts were able to separate the 
procedural from the substantive when applying the Erie doctrine.67  The Supreme Court 
then took a serious look at upholding arbitration clauses through a series of cases.68  The 
federal courts used their own rules and procedures, if a case was removed from a state 
court to a federal court, but avoided using their decisions to create federal substantive law 
applicable in state court cases.69  The Supreme Court was aware that if various state 
arbitration laws were applied in removal cases it could encourage forum shopping.70
Southland address the forum shopping problem head on by preempting state law.
The United States Supreme Court in Southland used statutory intent to couple the 
FAA to the Commerce Clause and enforce arbitration with a Supremacy Clause 
64 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).
65
 Schwartz, David S., Mandatory Arbitration:  Correcting Federalism Mistakes in Statutory 
Interpretation:  The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 Law & Contemp. Prob. 5 
(Winter/Spring 2004).  Professor Schwartz addresses the impact of Southland on Erie.  He concludes that 
Southland was not a good decision when it was made, but the Supreme Court has been unwilling to 
overrule its own precedent in Southland.
66
 Id. at 54
67
 Ware, Stephen J., Alternative Dispute Resolution 28-31, (West Group 2001).  Supra Note 54.
68
 Id.
69
 Id.
70
 Bernhardt, 350 U.S. 198 (1956) Supra Note 56.
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argument.71  When Southland interpreted the Article III procedural act FAA as a 
substantive law act FAA, it extended the reach of the FAA into state courts.72  State law 
could never be preempted by a federal procedural law, but state law will always be 
preempted by a federal substantive law.
V. The Cases Preceding Southland That Set The Stage For Southland:
The first significant departure from ordinary contract law governing contractual 
arbitrations came in the 1967 case of Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing 
Co.73 Prima Paint required federal courts to give special consideration to predispute 
arbitration clauses in regular contracts.74  The requirement of a special examination of 
arbitration clauses became known as the separability doctrine.75  It required federal courts 
to separate the arbitration clause from its so-called container contract for examination.76
This case was the beginning of elevated status in federal courts for contractual predispute 
arbitration clauses, because Prima Paint gave predispute arbitration agreements a unique 
status in contract law.77  Arbitration clauses were to be carved out and examined on their 
own merits.78 Prima Paint required courts to determine if the arbitration clause itself was 
71 Southland, Supra Note 4.
72
 Id.
73 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).  Prima Paint filed suit to rescind 
the entire contract with Flood & Conklin, including the arbitration clause, based on fraud in the inducement 
of the contract as a whole.  The federal district court stayed the case and sent the matter to arbitration.  The 
United States Supreme Court affirmed.  Tying the contract to interstate commerce instead of state contract 
law, the United States Supreme Court expressed what has become known as the “separability doctrine.”  
An allegation of fraud in the inducement of the contract as a whole will be decided by the arbitrators, 
unless the parties specifically withheld that issue from arbitration.  The Prima Paint court ruled that 
arbitration clauses are separable from the contract in which they are embedded.  Citing Section 4 of the 
arbitration clause, the courts may adjudicate it, but if there is a claim of fraud against the contract as a 
whole that claim will be arbitrated.  In a motion opposing a stay, a federal court may only examine issues 
relating to the arbitration clause itself to determine the validity of the stay.
74
 Id.
75
 Id.
76
 Id. at 402-403
77
 Id. at 403-404
78
 Id. at 403
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under attack or if the contract as a whole was being challenged.  If the contract as a whole 
that was alleged to be void ab initio, then the case would be sent to arbitration where the 
arbitrator(s) would decide the issues.79  If the arbitration clause itself was challenged, 
then courts would decide if the parties had agreed to arbitrate, and if arbitration was 
appropriate.80   This “special” analysis went well beyond placing arbitration clauses on 
the same footing as other contracts.81
Federal courts allow immediate review of orders denying arbitration, but disallow 
immediate appellate review of orders granting arbitration.82  The federal courts therefore 
treat arbitration agreements differently from other contracts.83  Courts that review 
arbitration awards do not review the awards based upon general contract principles, but 
the standards of review are limited to those set forth in the FAA.84  These modern review 
standards originated in Prima Paint.
The second major step on the path to Southland came in the 1983 United States 
Supreme Court case of Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction 
Company.85  In Moses H. Cone, the court declared a “liberal federal policy” favoring 
79
 Id. 
80
 Id. at 404
81
 Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Arbitration:  Cases and Problems, Lexis Nexis (2002) p. 54.
82 South Louisiana Cement, Inc. v. Van Aalst Bulk handling, B.V. 383 F. 3d 297, 300 (LA 2004).  
Interlocutory appeals from an order denying arbitration are “final” and thus appealable, but appeals from an 
order compelling arbitration are not appealable on an interlocutory basis.
83 Caley v. Gulfstrean Aerospace Corp., 333 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1374 (GA 2004).  Motion to compel 
arbitration in a class action based upon Fair Labor Standards Act was granted.  Arbitration clauses are not 
reviewed using the same standards as other contracts.
84 Wyman-Gordaon Co. Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Alabama, 337 F. Supp. 2d 241, 244 (Mass. 2004).
85 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).  Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital, a North Carolina medical facility, contracted with Alabama contractor Mercury 
Construction Corporation for additions to its physical plant.  The hospital drafted the contract between the 
two businesses, and the contract contained an arbitration clause.  Following disagreements over 
construction delays and money issues, unsuccessful attempts at negotiation were followed by a declaratory 
judgment action filed in a North Carolina state court, by the hospital.  The state court issued an injunction 
against arbitration, but rescinded the order upon protest by Mercury Construction.  After the stay was lifted, 
Mercury Construction filed a lawsuit in federal district court and moved to compel arbitration the federal 
district court stayed the federal case until resolution of the state court case.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
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arbitration.  Moses H. Cone held that the FAA section 2 created a body of “federal 
substantive law of arbitration.”86  Although the Moses H. Cone case involved a 
controversy over the issuance of a stay in a federal lawsuit until the state law claims had 
been resolved, its language regarding arbitration would resurface in Southland explaining 
the federal policy in favor of arbitration.87 Moses H. Cone also paved the way for the 
holding in Southland because it enunciated a federal policy in favor of arbitration by 
using a Commerce Clause argument.88  The special contract analysis required under 
Prima Paint and the favoritism enunciated in Moses H. Cone, in some ways “telegraphed 
the punch” of the Supreme Court in Southland.
VI. The Academy Speaks Out On Southland:  What Others Have Said:  
The shift in the high court’s preference for arbitration did not go unnoticed by legal 
scholars.89  Some scholars, like Professor Jean Sternlight have questioned the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Southland,90 while others like Professor Richard Reuben have 
explored the impact of this shift on the way state courts treat contractual arbitration 
clauses.91  Professor Stephen Ware and others have defended Southland and the United 
the Fourth Circuit reversed the federal district court and remanded the case for arbitration.  The United 
States Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit, and in doing so used the language that would soon 
become commonplace in federal arbitration cases.  Relying on the Commerce Clause argument for 
enforcement of arbitration, and citing both FAA Section 2 and Prima Paint, the court spoke of a “federal 
policy favoring arbitration.”
86
 Id.
87
 Schwartz, P. 35.  Supra Note 65.
88
 Id. 
89
 Sternlight, Jean R., Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s preference for Binding 
Arbitration:  A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers and Due Process Concerns, 72 
Tulane Law Rev. 1 (1997) See also Jean R. Sterlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the 
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 Ohio St. Journal on Dispute Resolution 669 (2001), and Jean 
R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool? Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding 
Arbitration, 74 Wash. U.L.Q. 637 (1996).  Professor Sternlight remains one of binding arbitrations most 
vocal critics regarding access to justice issues.
90
 Id.
91
 Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice:  Toward a State Act Theory of ADR, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 577 (1997).  
Professor Reuben has questioned the impact of binding arbitration under the FAA on other areas of law.
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States Supreme Court’s current position on arbitration.92   One of the leading critic’s of 
Southland has been Professor Ian MacNeil, whose book American Arbitration provides 
an in-depth analysis of the legislative history of the FAA.93  Professor Christopher 
Drahozal, who supports the Southland outcome, even thought the court’s reasoning may 
have been flawed has written articles in defense of Southland.94  In Professor Drahozal’s 
view, the majority in Southland may have used weak analysis, but the correct conclusion 
was reached.95
Legal scholars appear to locate themselves within or near two distinct camps 
regarding the Southland opinion:  Southland is good law or Southland is bad law.  
Obviously, some scholars like Professor Ware believe Southland was a well-reasoned 
decision supported by the historical facts, while others like Professor Sternlight believe 
Southland was a poorly reasoned decision that was not based on law or fact.  There are 
other scholars like Professor Drahozal who view Southland as good law regardless of the 
path the court took to arrive at its holding.  Still other scholars like Professor Reuben 
question the long-term impact of Southland on other areas of the law like individual 
rights.  There is no general consensus among legal scholars on the rationale or effect of 
Southland.  The academy seems as divided on Southland as the court who rendered the 
opinion.
92
 Stephen J. Ware, Contractual Arbitration, Mandatory Arbitration, and State Constitutional Jury Trial 
Rights, 38 U.S.F.L. Rev. 39 (2003).  Professor Ware defends arbitration clauses because people have a right 
to contract, and that right should not be denied.
93
 Ian MacNeil, American Arbitration Law:  Reformation, Nationalization Internationalization.  See Note 
44.  
94
 Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland:  Re-examining the Legislative History of the Federal 
Arbitration Act.  78 Notre Dame Law Review 101.  See also Revisiting Southland, 10 No. 3 Disp. Resol. 
May 23 (2004).
95
 Id.
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VII. The Primary Effect Of Southland On The Legal System:  Preemption of State 
Anti-Arbitration Laws.
The federal courts rely on the Supremacy Clause to preempt state anti-arbitration 
laws and uphold the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause to enforce the 
mandates of the FAA.96  In Southland, the Supreme Court held that Congress in 1925 had 
intended that the FAA be a substantive law act enforcing the Commerce Clause in all 
courts, and had never intended the FAA to be limited to Article III procedural matters.97
The Southland court resolved the continuing conflict between state and federal arbitration 
law by using the Supremacy Clause and the Commerce Clause as applied to the FAA to 
nullify the effect of state anti-arbitration laws.98
Although the Southland argument under Commerce Clause was persuasive for a 
majority of the court, the dissenting opinions of Justice Stevens, Justice Rehnquist and 
Justice O’Connor in Southland pointed out the fact that the FAA’s history was purely 
procedural.99  Justices Rehnquist’s and O’Connor’s review of congressional hearings 
preceding the FAA concludes that Congress never intended for the FAA to become a 
substantive law act.100  For all practical purposes, there is a presumption argument on 
both sides of the issue.  The members of Congress who held these hearings prior to the 
FAA’s passage can no longer be called upon to explain their intent in passing the FAA, 
because they died years ago, and their true intent for the FAA died with them.  The 
dissenting opinions in Southland seem to suggest Southland’s true purpose was to 
96
 Nathan E. Ross, Federalism v. The Greater Good. . . Should powerful Franchisors be Allowed to 
Contract for Home Court Advantage Through Forum Selection Clauses?, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 199, 212.  
The power given to Congress under the Constitution allows federal law to preempt contrary state law.
97
 465 U.S. 11 (1984).  Southland, Supra Note 4, at 11.
98
 Id. See also Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)
99 Southland, Supra Note 1.  465 U.S. 1 (1984).  See Justice Steven’s concurrence and dissent, and Justice 
O’Connor’s dissent.
100 Southland, Supra Note 1.  465 U.S. 1 (1984).  See Justice O’Connor’s dissent.
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establish a stare decisis favoring the use of arbitration agreements in contracts 
nationwide, rather than offering an interpretation of Congress’ true intent behind the 
FAA.101  Perhaps the majority’s interpretation of Congressional intent in Southland 
stretches the interpretative envelope, but it also accomplishes the goal of a harmonized 
approach to arbitration in all American courts.  One of the major effects of Southland on 
the legal system has been to eliminate state court forum shopping in arbitration cases and 
harmonizing the legal system on a divisive issue.
In Perry v. Thomas, Justice Stevens dissent re-visited the Southland opinion when 
he wrote, “Even though the Arbitration Act (FAA) had been on the books for almost 50 
years, apparently neither the Court nor the litigants even considered the possibility that 
the Act had pre-empted state created rights.  It is only in the last few years that the Court 
has effectively rewritten the statute to give it a pre-emptive scope that congress certainly 
did not intend.”102  Justice Stevens viewed Southland as a rewriting of the FAA to make 
the statute substantive law so as to preempt state arbitration law.103  The Southland
opinion thus created uniformity in the treatment of arbitration clauses, no matter which 
type of court was presented with a motion to compel arbitration.104
Southland led to cheers from the business community and to jeers from the 
plaintiff’s bar and consumer advocacy groups.  One Alabama plaintiff’s law firm, 
Beasley, Allen, Crow, Methvin, Portis & Miles PC, publishes a monthly newsletter 
containing a traffic symbol circle with a line drawn through it on the subject of 
101
 Id.
102 Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987).  The FAA preempts public policy in states that is anti-arbitration 
and also preempts state common law against arbitration.  Justice Stevens’ dissent in Perry compared the 
1973 case of Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973) to Perry and concluded 
the same facts yielded different results, due to the Supreme Court’s rewriting of the FAA in Southland.
103
 Id. at 493-494.
104
 Schwartz, Supra Note 65, at 53.
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arbitration.  Apparently, the message is “arbitration – no.”  The long-term effects of
Southland on Constitutional issues such as access to justice and the waiver of the Seventh 
Amendment right to a jury trial are still in the refinement stage.  There is no question that 
Southland has resulted in residual effects reaching across several areas of the law.  The 
clarification of these effects will take time to fully develop.
VIII.The Southland Progeny:  State Arbitration Laws Die Hard
The next major state law preemption case following Southland was Allied Bruce 
Terminex v. Dobson.105  Ala. Code 8-1-41(3), declared pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
could not be specifically enforced in Alabama.  The Supreme Court of Alabama in 
Terminex interpreted Southland to hold that Congress’ power to enforce the Commerce 
Clause under the FAA was limited to situations where the parties contemplated that 
interstate commerce would be substantially affected by their transaction.106  After 
weighing the facts in the Terminex case, the Supreme Court of Alabama determined that 
the parties did not contemplate that interstate commerce would be substantially affected 
by a termite bond issued on Dobson’s residence, and that Alabama’s anti-arbitration 
statute, Ala. Code 8-1-41(3), applied.107  The denial of the motion to compel arbitration 
was appealed by Terminex.  On appeal the United States Supreme Court found the 
Supreme Court of Alabama’s reasoning was based on too narrow an interpretation of 
“affecting commerce,” and held that the words “affecting commerce” should receive a 
very broad interpretation.  The United States Supreme Court held that the contemplation 
of the parties regarding commerce did not matter, but the actual transactions effect on 
105 Allied Bruce Terminex Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 282 (1995)
106 Dobson v. Allied Bruce Terminex Co., 628 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1993)
107
 Id. at 357
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commerce should determine whether the FAA applied.108  In Terminex the United States 
Supreme Court held that pest control chemicals shipped across state lines to treat 
Dobson’s house met the definition of interstate commerce.109
In addition to the Section 2 language from the FAA, the language from Southland
was generously used in Terminex.  Justice Breyer stated in Terminex that “nothing 
significant has changed in the ten years subsequent to Southland; no later cases have 
eroded Southland’s authority. . . .”110  It is interesting that Justice Breyer referred to 
Southland’s authority rather that the authority of the FAA.  Justice O’Connor wrote in her 
concurrence, “Today’s decision caps this court’s effort to expand the Federal Arbitration 
Act.  Although each decision has built logically upon the decisions preceding it, the 
initial building block in Southland laid a faulty foundation.”111  Although Terminex may 
have presented the court with a significant opportunity to limit or even overturn 
Southland, due to the head-on collision between the FAA and Ala. Code 8-1-41(3) 
occurring in a state court, the United States Supreme Court stood by Southland and 
strengthened the federal policy favoring arbitration in Terminex.112
There were at least two schools of thought regarding the impact of Terminex on 
state anti-arbitration laws:  the line of reasoning followed by the United States Supreme 
Court, and the line of reasoning followed by the Supreme Court of Alabama.  The 
Terminex opinion by the United States Supreme Court did not deter the Alabama 
Supreme Court from attempting to find some other way to uphold Alabama’s public 
policy on predispute arbitration agreements.  The Supreme Court of Alabama reasoned 
108
 Id.
109
 Id. See Note 106 at 282.
110
 Id.
111
 Id. at 272
112
 Id.
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that Ala. Code 8-1-41(3) had not declared unconstitutional by Terminex , but the 
application of the FAA to the facts in Terminex resulted in a transaction that substantially 
affected interstate commerce.113  This interpretation led the Supreme Court of Alabama to 
devise a five-prong test to determine if commerce had been affected, and the test created 
a line of state-commerce-only cases governed by Alabama’s anti-arbitration statute, and a 
parallel line of cases held to be substantially affecting interstate commerce governed by 
the FAA.114
Part of the Alabama court’s reasoning may have been a misunderstanding of the 
intent of the Terminex decision, but the public policy of Alabama as expressed in Ala. 
Code 8-1-41(3) probably played a major role in the establishment of the two streams of 
cases.  Unlike federal judges who are appointed, Alabama’s Supreme Court justices are 
elected.  State Supreme Court justices answer in the ballot box to the citizens’ assessment 
of their performance in upholding Alabama’s laws.115  They have a moral and ethical 
duty to follow the wishes of their constituency, but they also have a duty to follow the 
rule of law in their decisions.  The Alabama Supreme Court endeavored to do both things 
with a new line of reasoning.
The Supreme Court of Alabama explained their new line of reasoning in Sisters of 
the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Company,116 an Alabama case which utilized the 
Commerce Clause limitation language contained in United States v. Lopez.117  The United 
113 Sisters of the Visitation v. Cochran Plastering Co., 775 So. 2d 759 (2000).  Substantially affecting 
commerce test.  This case used U.S. v. Lopez, a criminal case to extract limiting language concerning the 
coverage of the commerce clause.
114
 Id.
115
 Ware, Stephen, The Alabama Story:  Arbitration Shows Law’s Connection to Politics and Culture, 
Dispute Resolution Mag. 24 (Summer 2000).
116 Sisters of the Visitation, Supra Note 113, at 761-765.
117 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  A criminal case regarding the use of a gun within a 
prohibited zone.  The case used limiting language under the commerce clause.
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States Supreme Court had held in Lopez that Congress’ power to enforce the Commerce 
Clause was not unlimited.  Lopez was a school zone gun case that had nothing to do with 
arbitration, but everything to do with limiting the power of Congress under the 
Commerce Clause.  The Supreme Court of Alabama used the holding in Lopez to 
construct a five-prong test to determine if the underlying transaction leading to the 
contract containing the predispute arbitration clause substantially affected interstate 
commerce, thereby activating the FAA mandate to arbitrate.118  If the facts of each case 
met all five-prongs of the Sisters substantial interstate commerce contracts test it was said 
to fall under the mandate of the FAA to arbitrate, but if the facts met only one or two of 
the prongs of the Sisters test it was governed by Ala. Code 8-1-41(3), because the power 
of Congress to control commerce was not unlimited.119
The second school of thought regarding the effect of Terminex on Ala. Code 8-1-
41(3) was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Citizens Bank v. 
Alafabco.120 Alafabco held that the words “involving commerce” should be given the 
broadest possible reading.  The interpretation of “involving commerce” set forth in 
Alafabco is the equivalent of “affecting commerce,” and this definition does not allow the 
states much “wiggle room” in drafting anti-arbitration statutes.121  It is clear from 
Alafabco that the federal courts will enforce almost any arbitration clause under the 
FAA’s mandate to arbitrate, and any contrary state law will be preempted.122  In fact, 
118 Sisters of the Visitation, Supra Note 113.
119
 Id.
120 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, 123 S.Ct. 2037, 2040 (2003).
121
 Id. 
122
 Id. at 2041
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Alafabco held that Congress’ Commerce Clause power “may be exercised in individual 
cases without showing any specific effect on interstate commerce.”123
Alabama has been in the forefront of the Southland controversy, but other states 
have also failed to accept the FAA mandates until a few struggles occurred highlighting 
the tension between state public policy and the FAA.  Some states have attempted to limit 
or eliminate arbitration altogether, if certain conditions are not met.  A Montana statute, 
for example, required any contract containing an arbitration clause to post a notice of the 
arbitration clause in bold letters on the front page of the contract to protect the unwary. 
However, the United States Supreme Court in Doctors Associates v. Casarotto held the 
statute’s notice requirement was unconstitutional, because it placed arbitration on a 
different footing from other contracts.124  A New York statute disallowed punitive 
damages in arbitration based upon a public policy against punitive damages in contract 
cases.  A contract containing an arbitration clause also contained choice of law language 
selecting New York law to govern the contract in Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman 
Hutton, Inc.125 The arbitrators returned an award containing punitive damages contrary to 
New York law.  Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court upheld the arbitrator’s 
award of punitive damages based upon the contract itself not excluding punitive 
123
 Id. at 2040
124 Doctor’s Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).  The United States Supreme Court held that 
courts cannot enforce a state policy that places arbitration clauses on unequal footing with other contracts.  
Special notice requirements do not apply to other contracts in Montana, so special notice requirements 
could not be applied to arbitration clauses.
125 Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).  The arbitrators granted punitive 
damages and the respondent appealed citing New York law’s prohibition on punitive damages in arbitration 
awards.  The United States Supreme Court allowed the punitive damages based upon the language of the 
underlying contract not excluding punitive damages.
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damages.126  Thus, parties to an arbitration agreement may contract for potential 
arbitration awards that are contrary to state law.127
The federal courts generally enforce state laws that support arbitration, even if those 
laws are not worded exactly like the FAA.128  The federal courts have made it clear that 
state laws eliminating arbitration will be preempted by the FAA, and only generally 
recognized state law contract defenses will be allowed to overcome the federal 
presumption in favor of arbitration.129  The federal presumption is that arbitration clauses 
should be enforced, and any doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration.130  District 
courts should not only stay litigation until the arbitration is completed, but also should 
stay litigation in the event a denied motion to compel arbitration has been appealed.131
The federal judiciary has made its point vividly clear with regard to state laws limiting or 
eliminating contractual binding arbitration.  Any state law which allows state courts to 
by-pass the mandates of the FAA will be pre-empted.  There are no exceptions.
IX. The Preemption of Federal Law by the FAA:  Waiver Of The Seventh 
Amendment Right To a Jury Trial In Arbitration.
At the time Southland was decided it was understood that in order to waive the 
constitutional right to a jury trial a person had to knowingly and intelligently waive that 
126
 Id.
127
 Id.
128 Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468 
(1989).  The United States Supreme Court upheld that opinion of the California Court of Appeal that 
California’s arbitration law, although much different from the FAA, did not conflict with the FAA because 
a contract to arbitrate would be enforceable under California arbitration law.  The Volt case involved a 
construction contract, containing an arbitration clause, but with a California choice of law provision.  
California law requires arbitration to be stayed until pending related litigation is resolved.
129Citizens Bank, Supra Note 113.
130 Masco Corporation v. Zurich American Insurance Co. 382 F.3d 624 (2004).  A general presumption in 
favor of arbitration exists and any doubts must be resolved in favor of arbitration unless it can be shown the 
arbitration clause does not cover the dispute.  A general arbitration clause is enforceable, even if contained 
in a contract that is voidable unless the arbitration clause is challenged.
131 Blinco v. Green Tree, case No. 04-10888 (11 Circ. 2004).
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right by signing an agreement containing a waiver.  This was not a major problem prior 
to Southland, but it became a sticky issue in some of Southland’s progeny.  Does a 
waiver require signatures to be held valid?  What standards of assent will be applied?  
The so-called “shrink wrap” cases allowed the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses even when the parties had not signed an arbitration agreement.  In Hill v. 
Gateway a federal court held consumers were required to arbitrate their claim against a 
computer manufacturer because the computer-shipping box held not only a computer, but 
also a package of shrink-wrapped documents notifying the consumers of an arbitration 
requirement.132  Thus, under a contractual assent standard, assent to use arbitration as an 
alternative forum to courts can be found by action or non-action.  Not all federal courts 
follow the contractual assent rule.  Some federal courts have held that consumers may not 
be held to a waiver of their rights by contractual assent, but actual notice and written 
waiver are required evidenced by a signature.133   The United States Supreme Court has 
not dealt with this waiver issue so as to clear up the divergent paths taken by federal 
courts in this area of constitutional law.
A non-signatory party may also be held to assent to waiver by endeavoring to use 
the contract containing the arbitration clause to their advantage.  Beneficiaries seeking to 
enforce a contract, although they never signed the contract, have also been held to the 
terms of an arbitration clause, because they seek to enforce the contract terms against a 
132 Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (1997).  Judge Easterbrook opined that the consumers who 
purchased a computer were bound by the terms of a contract to arbitrate contained inside the computer’s 
shipping box, because the terms of the contract required the consumer to return the computer within 30 
days or be bound by the terms of the contract, including the arbitration clause.  Although initially 
questioned on grounds of warranty laws, Hill is still considered good law in many federal courts.  In Falbe 
v. Dell, Inc. 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13188.  The U.S. District Court used Hill to analyze a Del computer case 
and order it to arbitration.  Judge Grady stated in the Falbe case that the court’s analysis “began and ended” 
with the 7th circuit’s decision in Hill.
133 Klosek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (Kan. 2000).
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signatory to the contract.134  If they seek enforcement of the terms they have accepted the 
terms.  Plaintiff Dobson in Terminex was a third-party beneficiary to the termite bond 
containing the arbitration agreement.  Therefore, the Supreme Court seems willing to 
accept contractual assent by Third Parties.
X. The Pandora’s Box of Southland’s Progeny:  Class Actions And Punitive 
Damages
Southland opened the door to creative thinking by some members of the plaintiff’s 
bar.  Courts have been divided for years over the appropriateness of class actions in 
arbitration.  Some courts have ruled out class actions in arbitration, while other courts 
have left the class action determination to the arbitrators.135  The United States Supreme 
Court in one of Southland’s progeny opened the door to class actions in arbitration by 
holding that arbitrators, not courts, may determine whether a class action will be 
allowed.136  Like the punitive damages issue presented in Mastroubuono, the holding in 
Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle can be interpreted to take a permissive 
approach if the contract language is silent on class actions.137  The holding in Bazzle is 
notice to contract drafters that remedies not excluded in the contract language may be 
134
 The Philadelphia Flyers, Inc. v. Trustmark Insurance Company, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 12772.  The 
court held that principles of equitable estoppel may require a non-signatory to be bound by the terms of a 
contract, including an arbitration clause, if the non-signatory attempts to enforce the terms of the contract.
135 Bazzle v. Green Tree Financial Corporation, 569 E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002).  Vacated in 2003 by Green Tree 
Financial Corporation v. Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. 2402.
136 Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle, 123 S.Ct 2402 (2003).  Class actions in arbitration have 
always presented problems for courts.  Should the court interpret the contract to determine if a class action 
is permissible, or should the arbitrators determine this issue?  State and federal courts have argued this 
issue for years, but the United States Supreme Court held in the Bazzle case that arbitrators have the 
authority to allow or prohibit a class action.  Bazzle puts contract drafters on notice to include preclusion 
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allowing the arbitrators to determine all other issues related to the arbitration.
137 Mastrobuono v Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52 (1995).  Supra Note 125.
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included.138  The current situation in arbitration has caused many contract drafters to re-
examine their standard arbitration clauses and shore up traditional boiler plate 
language.139  Some businesses may decide to refuse to arbitrate if class actions are 
allowed, but the party refusing to arbitrate under a contractual agreement has the burden 
to prove the contract is not subject to the enforcement provisions of the FAA.140  It is 
anyone’s guess as to how the courts will treat future class action cases due to the far-
reaching implications of Bazzle, but the decision has certainly caused the business 
community a great deal of concern.141  Arbitration clauses were presumed to have 
protected business’ exposure to class actions, but following Bazzle there is substantial 
doubt as to arbitrations’ ability to eliminate class actions.142
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 Huber, Stephen K., The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit, 3 5 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 497 
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139
 Kaplinsky, Alan S., and Levin, Mark J., Arbitration Update:  Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle-
Dazzle for Green Tree, Fizzle for Practitioners, 59 Bos. Law. 1265 (2004).  The disagreements over the 
meaning of Bazzle continue.  Does silence on class action mean there is a green light or a red light to class 
actions in arbitration?  No one really knows, but these two practitioners argue that it is only a matter of time 
before the U.S. Supreme Court will clarify this issue.
140
 Ware, Stephen J., Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver clauses, and other Contractual Waivers of 
Constitutional Rights, 67 SPG Law & Contep. Probs. 167 (2004).  Professor Ware concludes a pre-dispute 
binding arbitration clause merely replaces the jury trial with arbitration.  He points out that general contract 
defenses may be used against arbitration clauses, but state anti-arbitration clauses may not be used to set 
aside arbitration.  Professor Ware states that the FAA requires a contract law standard of consent, but many 
critics of the FAA wish to apply a knowing consent standard.  The knowing consent standard was rejected 
in favor of contract law standard of consent in Doctor’s Associates v. Cassarotto.  Professor Ware does not 
accept the argument that consumer arbitration clauses should be treated differently from contracts between 
businesses.  Professor Ware contrasts criminal and civil waivers and concludes the contractual consent 
waiver rather than the knowing consent waiver will likely prevail in future Supreme Court cases.
141
 Herndon, Robert Jason, Mistaken Interpretation:  The American Arbitration Association, Green Tree 
Financial Corporation v. Bazzle, and the Real State of Class-Action Arbitration in North Carolina, 82 
N.C.L. Rev. 2128 (2004).  Herndon begins this article by pointing out Green Tree v. Bazzle was a 
consolidation of two South Carolina class action suits involving a state consumer protection code.  A very 
divided U.S. Supreme Court heard the case, vacated the South Carolina decisions, and remanded the matter 
back to South Carolina’s Supreme Court.  The interpretation of Bazzle is important.  Some view Bazzle as 
allowing arbitrators to examine if a contract is silent as to class actions, while others contend that Bazzle
allows arbitrators to determine if a class action is allowed if the contract is silent.
142
 Id.
31
XI. Taking Contractual Arbitration To Work After Southland:  The All Powerful 
Agreement To Arbitrate In Employment Cases
The supporters of arbitration under the FAA point out that constitutional rights and 
statutory rights are not inalienable and can be waived by contract.143  An argument has 
arisen over the type of consent needed for waiver in employment cases and the results are 
mixed.  Some of arbitration’s supporters want a contractual standard of consent, while 
opponents want a knowing standard of consent.144  Contractual assent does not require an 
employee to be given an explanation of arbitration, while knowing assent requires 
evidence in writing of consent to arbitrate.  It may well be that the federal presumption in 
favor of arbitration has virtually eliminated knowing consensual waiver as a defense in 
contractual arbitration cases where the employee is a party to the contract.145  Employees 
are not generally held to contractual waiver in union contracts, because the employee 
played no role in the formation of the contract.
Drafters of arbitration clauses may not receive a totally unencumbered path to 
arbitration in statutory rights cases in the employment area.  Although a contracting party 
may have waived statutory rights by signing an arbitration agreement, a federal agency 
may still have a cause of action on behalf of the aggrieved party that is not subject to 
arbitration.146  For example, in EEOC v. Waffle House the court held that although an 
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 Stempel, Jeffery W., Securities Arbitration:  A Decade After McMahon:  Bookstrapping and Slouching 
Toward GOMORRAH:  Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 Brooklyn L. Rev. 1384 (1996).  
Professor Stempel points out that consent is a thing of the past.  Quoting Professor Speidel, he summarizes 
that consent is lately a legal fiction.  Professor Stempel makes a case for court determination of consent.
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146 EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) Government agencies can enforce federal statutory claims 
in court, even when the employee has agreed to arbitrate those claims.  The employee is estopped, but the 
EEOC may proceed.  Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20 (1991) opened the door for 
effective arbitration in employment disputes.  Other employment cases such as Circuit City Stores v. Adams
532 U.S. 105 (2001) helped expand the use of arbitration agreements in employment contracts.
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employee had waived statutory rights claims, the EEOC had not been estopped from 
pursuing those claims under the federal statute.147  Employers who choose to insert 
arbitration agreements into employment contracts can force the employee into arbitration 
but may not be able to use the FAA to force a federal agency out of the public law 
courts.148  Following Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. the green light was given 
to employers to use arbitration agreements in employment contracts to force employees 
to arbitrate all claims, including statutory claims.149  There exists a serious debate over 
whether employees should be forced to sign a contract waiving their constitutionally 
guaranteed rights in order to obtain employment.
XII. Defenses Against The FAA Mandate To Arbitrate Under State Contract Law:  
And Defenses To Awards Rendered:
Defenses to arbitration agreements and avoidance of arbitration is dependent upon 
state contract law defenses.  All of the normal state law defenses to contracts are 
available to a party seeking to avoid arbitration on the grounds that the arbitration 
agreement is flawed.  Mutual mistake is not often used as a defense to the arbitration 
contract, although it is conceivable the party seeking to set aside the arbitration 
agreement could prove the parties agreed to different terms when forming the agreement 
to arbitrate.150  Detrimental reliance on terms that were fraudulently induced can serve as 
grounds to rescind a contract.151  The fundamentals of this defense are that one party lied, 
the lie was intentional and was told for purposes of inducing the other party to contract, 
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 Gilmore, Grant, Death of Contract, Ohio State, 1974 P. 40.
151 Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, 938 P. 2d 903 (1997).  Cancer victim sued an HMO for 
fraudulent misrepresentation of the terms of the arbitration agreement.  The court allowed the revision of 
the contract to arbitrate due to the misrepresentations.
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the other party relied on the lie to enter the contract and damages resulted.152  Courts have 
also sustained breach of contract claims against the drafters of contracts of adhesion 
when the arbitration process contained in the contract lacked “the rudiments of even-
handedness.”153  Courts have held that contracts that are constructed as one-sided in favor 
of the drafter are unconscionable and are subject to rescission.154  These cases are, 
however, the exception to the reality of arbitration agreements.  Once executed, there are 
few sustainable defenses against an arbitration agreement.  In the vast majority of cases, 
agreements to arbitrate are upheld and enforced by the courts.  
Georgia was the first state to recognize manifest disregard of the law by the 
arbitrator(s) as a ground for vacatur of an arbitration award.155  While there is growing 
interest in manifest disregard of the law as a vehicle for challenging arbitration awards, 
the best definition of “manifest disregard of the law” is still in the developmental 
stages.156  Another area of keen interest is the potential of award challenges based on 
arbitrator bias.  California has passed new ethical standards for arbitrators requiring 
disclosure of past dealings between arbitrators and the parties.157  Although arbitrators 
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and arbitration providers oppose these new standards of disclosure, the opponents of 
arbitration hope to prove arbitration bias through the information obtained through these 
standards.158  Arbitrator bias can also be a ground upon which to assert a contract defense 
of unconscionability against the arbitration process.159  If the opponents of arbitration can 
demonstrate financial ties to one of the parties by the arbitrators, they may have a ground 
for setting aside any award rendered based on bias or challenging the process before the 
hearing is held on grounds of unconscionability.  Financial consequences of the 
arbitration on the challenging party appears to be a more difficult defense, unless there is 
proof on record of the financial inequities of the process on one of the parties.160
In addition to the state law contract defenses to the arbitration agreement, parties 
also have defenses to the arbitration award.  9 USC Section 10 lists the following grounds 
for vacating an arbitration award:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of 
them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the 
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent 
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the 
rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them 
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was 
not made.
reasons.  Obviously, large corporations, arbitrators whose incomes are largely derived from repeat business, 
and arbitration providers like AAA oppose the new rules.  Ms. Kent concludes that some ethical disclosure 
standards for arbitrators are necessary.
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Note 153.
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(5) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required 
the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a 
rehearing by the arbitrators.
All but one of the grounds involves arbitrator misconduct.  All are exceptionally difficult 
to prove.  9 U.S.C. Section 11 also provides the following grounds for modifying or 
correcting a flawed arbitration award:
(a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident 
material mistake in the description of any person, thing, or property referred 
to in the award.
(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, 
unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matter 
submitted.
(c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the 
controversy.
Conclusion
Prior to Southland, the chief problem for federal courts in diversity cases containing 
arbitration clauses was that not all state arbitration laws were the same.  For example, 
New York promoted the use of predispute contractual arbitration, Alabama prohibited the 
use of predispute contractual arbitration and California allowed predispute contractual 
arbitration in some cases, while prohibiting it in others.161  Therefore, depending upon the 
state law to be applied by the federal courts under the Erie principle to the facts of the 
cases, the outcomes could be radically different.  Such state-to-state variances could lead 
to forum shopping in arbitration cases, which was troubling to the United States Supreme 
Court.162  The cases prior to Southland offered little help in resolving the forum shopping 
dilemma, because the FAA’s language did not grant federal jurisdiction in arbitration 
161
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cases.163  The FAA had been written like a federal procedural act and it lacked the 
trappings of a substantive law act.  Although the dilemma was addressed in early federal 
cases involving the FAA, there appeared to be little the courts could do about the 
problem, due to the application of the Erie principle.164
Southland addressed the problem and resolved the dilemma by converting a 
procedural FAA into a substantive law act by placing a new interpretation on the intent of 
Congress regarding the FAA.  The majority in Southland cited some of the testimony 
from the Congressional hearings leading up to the FAA, and concluded that Congress had 
intended the FAA to be substantive using a Commerce argument.165  The minority in 
Southland also cited testimony from the Congressional hearings leading up to the FAA, 
and their conclusion was that the FAA was never intended to be substantive.  Southland’s 
progeny share the theme of expansion of the FAA’s reach with their common ancestor.  
Circuit City Stores v. Adams held that the Congressional intent behind the FAA was to 
regulate commerce and preempt contrary state laws.166 Geir v. American Honda Motor 
Co. held that state law must yield if it stands in the way of the accomplishment of the 
purposes and objectives of Congress.167  Contractual arbitration agreements will be 
enforced unless state law contract defenses apply.168  The point is that state contract law 
cannot bring federal commerce to a halt by prohibiting the use of arbitration and insisting 
upon litigation in every contracts case.
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The progeny contain language from both the FAA and Southland and usually a 
dissent or two stating the FAA was never intended to apply to the state courts.  Although 
the United States Supreme Court has been provided with numerous opportunities to limit 
or reverse its holding in Southland over the past twenty-one years, the high court has 
declined to change its direction.  Southland has successfully sailed around the rocks Erie, 
but the question remains where is arbitration going now that Southland has cleared the 
jettys?  
Opponents of arbitration continue to attack the fairness of the process and point out 
access to justice problems created by the contractual waivers of rights contained in 
arbitration clauses.169  Their argument is a repackaging of the old ouster doctrine under 
the common law, preferring litigation over arbitration in all cases.  The common law 
view of predispute contractual arbitration as a revocable process, was dealt a death blow 
by Southland.  The question of whether Southland and its progeny have resulted from a 
court legislating from the bench, or simply a reinterpretation of Congressional statutory 
intent, becomes a moot question in light of current federal law.  Southland does not 
represent the first case to reinterpret the intent behind existing statutory law, and it is 
unlikely that Southland will be the last such case.  Current federal case law favors the 
enforcement of binding predispute arbitration clauses, and there is no indication by the 
courts or Congress that the rule of law in this area is likely to change anytime soon.  
Arbitration’s opponents appear to be fighting a losing battle in their efforts to limit or 
eliminate the FAA or reverse the holding in Southland.  Perhaps their time would be 
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better spent in finding creative ways to use the FAA to benefit their clients, like the 
claimants in Green Tree v. Bazzle.170
Southland’s progeny are continuing to define the length and width of arbitration’s 
reach under the FAA.  No doubt, some members of the legal profession long for the days 
of yesteryear when the law was more static in this area.  However, the full effect of 
Southland and its progeny has yet to be realized.  The initial issues of binding agreements 
to arbitrate and preemption of state antiarbitration laws have been resolved.  The law in 
this field has now moved on to address new issues like the availability of punitive 
damages and class actions.  It is likely to be some time before the law is settled in those 
areas.  Southland removed the lid from a Pandora’s box of possibilities for enforcement 
of arbitration under the FAA because it created a federal common law with regard to 
arbitration.  The only organization that can replace that lid is the United States Congress, 
and Congress has not given the slightest indication of any impending efforts to limit or 
eliminate the FAA.
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